In the case of the City of London,' Lord COKE said that a writ of error would not lie upon a decision on habeas corpus. In the cases arising from the Aylesbury election in 1703-4, 2an effort was made to obtain writs of error to the House of Lords upon a decision in Queen's Bench, remanding the prisoners on a habeas corpus. The Commons addressed the Queen against, and the Lords in favor of, granting the writs of error, and Parliament was prorogued in order to elude the question.
3 Subsequently 4 it was repeated, after Lord COKE, that it was against the nature of a writ of error to lie on any decision but in causes where issue might be joined and tried, or where judgment might be had on, a demurrer, and therefore it would not lie on a decision on habeas corpus. Upon this opinion, a writ of error was taken to the House of Lords, and it was affirmed.
5
And it is said 6 that, seemingly, the question whether a writ of error lies on a decision on habeas corpus is no longer open in England, although at least one respectable professional opinion has been expressed that the writ should lie. In America, the question has arisen in two remarkable cases, and also in several others less noted.
In That although the Judges, who, in Holmes vs. Jennison, were of opinion that a writ of error would lie, founded their opinions on the statute, this does not weaken the effect of those opinions on the general question independent of statutory provisions, for, in order so to found their opinions on the statute, they were obliged to consider the decision on a habeas corpus as "a final judgment in a suit."
That since the decision in Holmes vs. Jennison, the Congress of the United States inserted a special clause in a statute, 2 to" authorize an appeal, in certain cases, on decisions on habeas corpus.
That the current of authority in America is, decidedly, that an appeal or writ of error will not lie, independently of statutory provisions, on a decision upon habeas corpus, such decision not being a final judgment. On the whole, it would seem that the better opinion is, that no appeal or writ of error should, independently of statutory provisions, be allowed on a decision on habeas corpus. Sensible difficulties oppose the contrary rule. An appeal or writ of error can only be taken upon a final judgment; a final judgment is, from its very nature, conclusive between the same parties upon the facts and law which it decides, and can only be reversed or examined by some proceeding in the nature of appedl; and yet a decision in a habeas corpus case, at least in refusing the writ or remanding the prisoner, (which last was the case in Bolme8 vs. Jennison,) binds io other Court whatever, but the same state of facts and the same questions of law, between the same parties, may be investigated over and over again, and differently decided on new applications for, or writs of, habeas corpus, as long as there are different Courts to go to. An application for a habeas corpus, or for a discharge thereon, is peculiarly to the discretion of the Court or Judge'to whom it is made, and it would be difficult, (said Mr. Justice BALDWI.S, in ffolme8 vs. Jennison,) to find any authority authorizing an appeal or writ of error upon the discretionary action of a j~idicial officer. It is now, probably, the case everywhere, that a habeas corpus may be issued and decided by any cominon law Judge in vacation, and it is not easy to see how an appeal or writ of error could lie, or on what they could be founded, when, as in such a case, there is no Court, no record, and therefore, it is submitted, can be no "judgment ;" yet if an appeal or writ of 'error will lie once, they should lie always.
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